Image via WikipediaI recently reread an old paper I wrote in a philosophy class that has had me in stuck in an infuriating loop thinking about our true motives when we act charitably. It was a paper examining Joel Feinberg’s essay that criticizes the concept of Psychological Egoism, which Feinberg defines as the belief that all desires have as their ultimate end self-interest. So for example, if I donate a ton of money to my local community center and they build a ‘James Raftery Center for Obese Orphans’ the fact that I get a building named after me and the respect of my peers makes my action self interested.This may sound silly to you, but this line of thinking actually bothers me when I’m contemplating being charitable. For example, I decided yesterday that whenever I walked by someone collecting money on the street for the homeless or any other charity I would give them any spare change I had. Since I spend about an hour walking to and from Penn Station each day, this would ensure that I never had to carry around coins for very long. This seemed like a brilliant idea because making a rule like this would cause me to donate more than I normally would, it would keep my pockets nice and light, and it would ease my mind because I could feel like I was being a good person and not even have to think about it anymore! As far as a utilitarian is concerned, this would be a win all around.
However, the cynical psychological egoist in the back of my mind won’t stop nagging me. I keep thinking about how I’ll feel good about myself every time I hear “God bless you, sir” when I drop my change in the bucket, or the moral superiority I’ll feel to everyone around me who isn’t donating. Also, when debating whether or not it was a good rule to adopt, the only way I could evaluate it was by trying to imagine how great of a person someone would think I was if they were told about my rule! These are definitely not the kinds of generous intentions you’re supposed to have if you’re being charitable… (and that’s not even considering the crazy meta-smugness I’ll no doubt derive from writing a blog post about it!)
So is there any way to be charitable without getting too much self-gratification from it? Anonymous donation seems to be a good answer – but it doesn’t eliminate the self satisfaction you’d have (even if nobody else knows about it, it’s there) or the tax write-off. No, what we need is a Psychological Egoist Fund that takes money out of your bank account without you knowing it and donates that to charity. Naturally, our psychological egoist couldn’t sign himself up for this service, as that would make him feel too good about what he was doing! The best thing to do would obviously be to have friends or family secretly sign him up for the service somehow.
Alternatively, our poor psychological egoist could donate like normal, but feel so guilty about all of the selfish motives that giving was no longer pleasant. Hopefully that will take all the fun out of donating, which is of course the point.
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Smugness is an inherent part of donating money. It's unavoidable. One can not be removed from the other. And thank goodness! Otherwise what would motivate people to donate? A genuine feeling of love for your fellow man? Duty? If these are your motivations, you also receive satisfaction from donating money.
ReplyDeleteThough I appreciate the creativity of you solution... which is really just saying people should steal from others and donate their money for them... in a Robin Hood type fashion... I believe I have a solution.
If you really wanted (and nobody does) to give charitably with no benefit to oneself then there is one option. Work as a voluteer for a charitable cause, with a brown bag over your head, and a supervisor who constantly tells you you are worthless and that you are not helping. In that situation no one would know you were helping, and you would be so emotionally abused by your higher-up that you would actually think you are not helping, though you would continue to do it in order to help.
But that's awesome that you donate your change, you are a better human being than I. Currently I am my own most important charity, and I donate my entire paycheck to myself. It gives me much satisfaction.
James you are already better than everyone so any additional smugness is moot.
ReplyDeleteIn all seriousness though, I agree that all actions are self-serving (i.e. are done for selfish reasons). That fact alone removes one degree of freedom from our decision making. After you accept this fact, you can simply realize that some self-serving acts are better than others, such as being charitable. You may as well help others as a by-product of being smug and selfish instead of hurt others. It's really a pretty simple philosophy.
Unless there’s an equally smug-minded person waiting to declare your act of donation ‘smug’, your egoist image of yourself is all in your head. Also, the person declaring you smug would have to be so determined to not be smug that they wouldn’t have donated at all, and does it make them inherently smug to have thought that way? I’m going to say smug one more time, ‘smug’.
ReplyDeleteNo one’s going to grill another person for donating money, certainly not the person your donating to. Unless you do something to otherwise insult them. The only interaction that matters is between you and the person your donating to, and the only information they have about you is your action. Anything outside that interaction is exterior and meaningless.
I know this won’t help your moral dilemma, but be comforted by the fact that your charity probably helped buy that guy lunch.
The Behaviorist Speaks: Behavior only continues to occur because it has been reinforced. As Caitlyn says, no one would donate if they didn't receive reinforcement for it ("God bless you"/Tax refund/Building named after you/Fuzzy warm feeling). It is a LAW! So don't feel bad... it's how humans work. People do things because: a) they are coerced b) they are reinforced c) they are triggered to reflexively (PTSD, blinking at the puff of air, etc) Most things are in category b, thank goodness! So relax and enjoy the science!!! It benefits the cause you're donating to as well.... no harm in being mutually beneficial!
ReplyDeleteKate! I love that you brought some legit stuff to the discussion! I just thought I'd throw out another example of James' charity conundrum... My friend Ben at work sometimes takes secret trips to Dunkin Doughnuts. He then arrives at my desk with a delicious hot chocolate with whipped cream just for me! It always makes my day so much happier... and If I'm having a bad morning like today it cheers me up. I thanked him many times today because I really appreciated it. His response was, "I only get it for you to see your happy reaction. It makes me feel freedom, and this feeling seems outside or above my every day grind here. It's nice."
ReplyDeleteThat just made me laugh and think about this thread. As the person on the receiving end of the charity, selfish motivations don't really bother me. haha.
Now it seems to me that on the whole we are not considering the matter completely aright.
ReplyDeleteI would not call the instinct towards self-affirmation a part of charity. There is no charity in this case.
Charity is properly love. The highest love. With this love the self is furthest from its meanness and passions and closest to the essence of humanity.
When I volunteer in the ER there are two modes.
One is annoyed boredom about being on my feet and not really having an important function. This is a bullshit.
The other is a complete self-outside self caught up in a wave of motion that has as its goal the relief of suffering. There is no self-affirmation here, there is simply doing your best.
Nobody is really looking for thanks, you are just making the proper action happen. Along with witnessing surgery it is the most exhilarating feeling I have ever known.
Let us turn to an authority, Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Article 1. Whether charity is friendship?
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Daniel 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.
Objection 2. Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Matthew 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.
Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.
On the contrary, It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Corinthians 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
Reply to Objection 1. Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Philippians 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apocalypse 22:3-4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
Reply to Objection 2. Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Ondeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
Reply to Objection 3. The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.
Article 2. Whether charity is something created in the soul?
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
Objection 2. Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deuteronomy 30:20: "He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
Objection 3. Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in 17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, 6, 1): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (I-II, 114, 4) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.
Reply to Objection 2. God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
Reply to Objection 3. Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
Article 3. Whether charity is a virtue?
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
Objection 2. Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
Objection 3. Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him."
I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1), viz. human reason and God.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, (4, 5) and hope (17, 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (I-II, 25, 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
Reply to Objection 3. Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. On this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.
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